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The Henry Wells Lawrence Lectureship is a memorial to Professor Henry 
Wells Lawrence, Chairman of the Department of History and Government at 
Connecticut College from 1920 to 1942. It was founded and endowed by his 
former students, colleagues, and friends so as to make it possible "to bring to 
the campus annually a scholar in the broad field of history who will present his 
subject in the spirit of the liberal tradition to which Dr. Lawrence was devoted." 
The present volume contains the seventh, eighth, and ninth lectures 
delivered under this foundation. The fifth, by Professor Perry Miller of Har­
vard University, discussed the contributions made by Jonathan Edwards to the 
development of social criticism as an aspect of the religio-millennial thought of 
the "Great Awakening." Professor Conyers Read of the University of Pennsyl­
vania delivered the sixth lecture upon the subject, "Problems of Present-Day 
Britain." In this he analyzes in their historic setting the continuing problems 
of the nation which was the mother of liberalism in the western world, per­
plexities that have some prospect of projecting themselves into the future. These 
two lectures are not included in this volume. 
The contributors discuss varied phases of the liberal tradition in the his­
tory of the Atlantic world. 
Professor Hajo Holborn of Yale University presented the seventh lecture on 
October 21, 1950, when he discussed "The Reasons for the Failure of the Paris 
Peace Settlement." Essentially comparative, projecting the program and prob­
lems of the Paris peace-makers against the historic situation of 1919 and the 
achievements of the Congress of Vienna of 1814-15, this essay analyzes prob­
lems of European reconstruction and world organization with which liberals of 
this century must continue to grapple. The significance of the participation of 
the United States in the peace-making of 1919 is developed in the light of both 
American security in the Atlantic community and European circumstances while 
Woodrow Wilson's program is reappraised. 
The eighth lecture was delivered by Professor Paul Wallace Gates, Chair­
man of the History Department and Professor of American History of Cornell 
University on November 11, 1951. His subject was, "From Individualism to 
Collectivism in American Land Policy." This essay is a highly original study 
of the evolution of thought and policy in a field that has been intimately related 
to the origins and rise of the American democracy. The shift from individual­
ism to collectivism is analyzed in the light not only of ideas but also of 
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indigenous, practical problems and objectives. The importance of this trend for 
traditional individualist liberalism and for the present day is stressed. 
Professor Helen Maud Cam, Zemurray Professor of History at Radcliffe 
College, Harvard University, delivered the ninth lecture on October 28, 1952. 
Her subject was, Representative Institutions in England and Europe in the 
Fifteenth Century in Relation to Later Developments." This essay presents a 
broad and penetrating analysis of constitutional government as it emerged in 
England during the era of the Renaissance. This is compared with developments 
that doomed representative institutions on the Continent to innocuous desuetude. 
At the same time, fundamental aspects of constitutionalism of continuing im­
portance are developed with a view to their pertinence to the Tudor and Stuart 
eras, the period of Whig dominance under the Hanoverians, and the twentieth 
century. 
When read together with the first and second volumes of the Series it can 
be seen that the Lawrence Lectures provide a continuing forum for the analysis 
and discussion of the liberal tradition in the light of historical experience. The 
relevance of the essays in the present volume to important themes of current 
historical research will be apparent to scholars in their several fields. Laymen 
interested in the history of liberalism and its contributions to an intelligent 
understanding of the mid-twentieth century will find here many a shrewd com­
ment and appraisal of events, ideas, trends, and problems that are useful in 
confronting the problems of the age. 
CHESTER MCARTHUR DESTLER, Editor 
Chairman, Department of History 
II. 
THE REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE PARIS 
PEACE SETTLEMENT 
BY HAJO HOLBORN 
The historical problem of this discussion has overshadowed the lives of all 
living people. The year 1919 was the high watermark of democracy in world 
history. Not even 1945 can be compared to that year, since in 1945 the demo­
cratic nations shared their victory with the Soviet Union and the major spoils 
of victory went to the latter. In 1919 no autocratic nor authoritarian power 
could obstruct the peace settlement. Still, "the war to make the world safe 
for democracy," a phrase first coined by H. G. Wells in August 1914 to describe 
World War I, brought forth before long the age of the dictators. "The war to 
end war," as World War I was often termed, turned out to be a harbinger of 
growing disaster. 
It is understandable that the failure of the peace settlement of 1919 caused 
a revolution of popular sentiment against collective action in international 
affairs, which had a most unfortunate effect upon the course of events leading 
up to World War II. On the other hand, the statesmen of World War II took 
pains to avoid the repetition of what they considered to have been the blunders 
of their predecessors of twenty-five years ago while at the same time trying to 
realize some of their lofty ideals. The endeavor to find an objective historical 
interpretation of the Paris peace settlement of 1919 is not a study of issues 
belonging to a past age. In analyzing them we must reflect to a large extent 
on our own political attitudes and objectives, and we may hope to gain a better 
understanding of the requirements for constructive action in our own day. 
The only peace settlement comparable in scope to that of 1919 was the 
peace of Vienna of 1815. Nineteenth century historians heaped nothing but 
condemnation on Castlereagh, Metternich, Czar Alexander, and Talleyrand for 
their failure to anticipate the forces of liberalism, nationalism, and industrialism 
which were to gain ascendancy in the course of the century. Woodrow Wilson 
was completely under the influence of this criticism and sternly insisted that 
no "odor of the Vienna settlement" should come into the discussion of Paris, 
"not even by reference." 
It was true that the Vienna peacemakers did not have a foreknowledge of 
the future. What they sensed of the potential future strength of liberalism and 
nationalism filled them with apprehension rather than sympathy. But the peace­
makers of Vienna had a clear grasp of what had held the old Europe together 
before the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon disrupted it. They had 
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a common faith in the balance of power as the regulative principle of the 
comity of European states. Long before the Congress of Vienna convened each 
diplomatic and military action of the five major powers had been undertaken 
with a view to the restoration of the European balance of power. 
When in December 1812 Czar Alexander ordered the Russian army to 
cross the western frontier of Russia in the pursuit of Napoleon's decimated 
orces he made it clear to the world that Russia would not rest satisfied with 
driving foreign invaders from Russian soil but would continue the war to the 
destruction of any continental empire greater than her own. When Austria 
joined the alliance in the late summer of 1812 she was already afraid that a 
collapse of Napoleon's empire might open the way to Russia's predominance 
on t e continent. All through the war Austria used the greatest circumspection 
an every device of diplomatic maneuver to preserve the historic France, since 
Metternich believed that France was needed in the councils of the great Euro­
pean powers. The entire military and diplomatic strategy of the Allied cam­
paigns was carefully molded in accordance with the ultimate political aims of 
Austria, Britain, and Russia to restore a European equilibrium. Before the 
cone usion of hostilities the Allies had entered among themselves into political 
agreements which clearly adumbrated the restoration of the European balance 
system. Grave conflicts divided the Congress of Vienna, but the preparation 
of a peace settlement through well-directed wartime policies and the unity on 
asic principles among the statesmen carried the Congress to its success. 
he achievements of the Vienna Congress were impressive. For a century 
no general European war comparable to the thirty-odd years of belligerency 
and upheaval after 1792 recurred. Moreover, for forty years after 1815 no war 
T s L  ° U f  ! o e e n  a n y  o f  t h e  S r e a t  E u f o p e a n  p o w e r s .  T h e r e a f t e r  b e t w e e n  
854 and 1870 wars between two or more major European states took place in 
1870 * Sh°Uld te mentioned that *e Franco-Prussian war of 
R„«o T T, r0t St Waf CVer fou&ht till that time. Again between the 
Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 and the Tripolitanian and Balkan wars of 1911-
ascHb. r°pean War°[ ̂  ProPortions burred. It would be deceptive to 
eress of V" """l I ,hlstory of whole nineteenth century to the Con-
fmount oT16"?-!' ,Ut a Si°nS °f this con8ress must have contained a large 
oTvln 8 1 W1Sd0m" The POlitkal maP of Eur°Pe -hich the Congress 
noteworthv *7 7T ^ substantia% changed for a century. It is also 
neutral Belv" & E ^ S°mC °f theS£ changes, for example the creation of a 
neutral Belgium, were attained by peaceful negotiations among the big powers. 
i n  n i n e t e e n t - h  ^ a d < ? e d  a t  0 n c e  t b a t  t b e  i m p o r t a n t  c a s e s  o f  p e a c e f u l  c h a n g e  
principle intend ^ ^ ,TO fCW in number' The baIance of Power 
Europe but ul" ̂  m ̂  °f unity a d'vided 
ures Even A ^ n*ans for the msurance of peaceful proced­
ures. Events proved ,t to be at best of assistance in staving o/a general Euro-
THE REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE PARIS PEACE SETTLEMENT 5 
pean war, but not wars as such. And as the century drew on wars grew ever 
more disruptive. With the industrialization of certain continental states like 
Germany and with the vast increase in the destructive power of modern armies 
the European balance of power lost much of its effectiveness. But the statesmen 
of Vienna themselves had already known that the balance of power by itself 
could not guarantee peace in all circumstances. They had attempted to build 
a concert of Europe which was to guard the political and social order of the 
world. Yet the sound concept of a united European action was frustrated by the 
social bias of the statesmen of the Holy Alliance. They understood social order 
in strictly conservative or reactionary terms as the preservation of absolute 
monarchy and the privileges of nobility. It was impossible to suppress the 
modern capitalistic development and the concomitant liberal and national move­
ments. The concert of Europe broke down after seven years, largely because 
Britain, far advanced in her own political and social development, was un­
willing to tolerate intervention in the affairs of others by a group of reactionary 
states. 
If we compare the Paris to the Vienna settlement it is obvious that some 
of the fundamental elements which made for unity and mutual understanding 
among the peacemakers of Vienna were lacking in 1919. The wars of 1812-
1815 had a common aim, namely the defeat of Napoleon's attempt at uniting 
the European continent under his dictatorial power and the restoration of the 
old European state system. The war of 1914-1918 did not have such a single 
common denominator. Of course, the immediate war aim, the destruction of 
Germany's overweening power, was generally shared by all the Allies, but there 
was no clarity about the type of Europe the Allies wanted to re-erect. There 
were ideas to replace the old balance of power system by the rule of law sup­
ported by a League of Nations, and the realization of national self-determination 
was usually considered the most important preparatory step in this direction. 
But the actual policies were not in line with these high aspirations. The exigen­
cies of war drove the European statesmen to rely even more extensively upon 
the balance of power. Two distinctions have to be drawn at this point, the 
first concerning the general character of World War I and the other with regard 
to the balance of power in Europe. 
In a strict sense the war that started in August, 1914, was not a world 
war but a European war. The British originally called it the "Great War." 
Although the frictions among European nations had been greatly aggravated 
by the competition for colonial possessions and profits in the forty years prior 
to 1914, the war was caused by European issues. It was true that Britain en­
joyed from the outset the support of her world-wide empire and that Japan 
very soon began the conquest of the German colonies in the Far East. Still, the 
war of 1914 was, and remained till 1917, basically a European war, and every­
body expected that its great decisions would be the result of the military efforts 
of the major European powers. 
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Each of the two camps of states, the Triple Entente and the Central Pow­
ers, believed itself to be capable not only of balancing but also of outbalancing 
each other on the battlefields. France, Britain, and Russia felt confident that 
they could overwhelm Germany and Austria-Hungary if not in the early begin­
ning certainly at a time when the British blockade became fully effective and 
Russia could throw her millions into the fray. Germany on her part planned 
to use the time gained by the slow mobilization of Russia to administer a 
knock-out blow to France and then turn around toward the East to stem the 
Russian tide. But the calculations of the European statesmen and generals of 
all these nations proved wrong. The Germans did not conquer France. The 
battle of the Marne brought the German advance to a standstill without giving 
the Allies the strategic initiative. In spite of the unprecedented slaughter of 
millions, a strategic stalemate ensued for practically four years at the western 
front. 
Events at the eastern front made it impossible for Britain and France to 
derive full advantage from the alliance with Russia and vice versa. Russia had 
millions of soldiers but not the industries to arm them nor the transportation 
to move vast armies and their supplies. If Churchill's scheme to seize the 
Turkish Straits in 1915 had been successful, the East-West alliance might have 
become powerful enough to crush Germany. But Germany sitting athwart the 
communication lines between Russia and her western allies could choose where 
to take the offensive. Russia in her isolation succumbed to the German on­
slaught. The whole politcal and social organization of the old Russia broke 
into smithereens. In the spring of 1918 Germany could marshal superior 
forces which would have defeated the British and French armies if American 
troops had not been available for their relief and support. 
After the great disappointment of the fighting in the early months of the 
war the Allies had gone around shopping for additional allies who would help 
them to tip the balance against Germany. Dire military necessity seemed to 
make the concessions inevitable which the Allies made in order to bring Italy 
and Rumania into the war. The secret treaties sacrificed liberal principles on 
the altar of Mars and nationalistic power politics. It is frightening to visualize 
what Europe would have looked like if the European allies, including Russia, 
had been victorious over the central powers without the intervention of the 
United States. No doubt this would have been still much preferable to the 
dictates which Ludendorff would have imposed in case of a German victory. 
His Russian treaties of Brest-Litovsk and the Rumanian treaty of Bucharest 
were clear examples of his ultimate aims. But if the European Allies had made 
the peace, a Europe would have come into being on very shaky grounds as a 
result of the secret treaties. 
The secret treaties did not restore the European balance of power. As a 
matter of fact, the European war of 1914-1917 proved that the European politi­
cal system that originated in 1494 and grew to maturity in the 18th century 
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was drawing to its death. The great European war was finally decided by the 
intervention of the United States, and with the entrance of the United States 
in the war it definitely became a world war. 
The war of 1914 threatened to destroy the Atlantic order on which Ameri­
can security had rested during the 19th century. If the Allies had been defeated 
the United States would have had to face on the eastern shores of the Atlantic 
a practically united continent which could even draw on the resources of Eur­
asia. And this huge accumulation of power would have been in the hands of a 
state which in the quarrels over the international law of the sea gave America 
a foretaste of its dictatorial manners. The United States had good reasons for 
associating herself with the Allies at a time when, owing to the impending 
Russian collapse, their fortunes were falling. The American people, unhappily, 
often lost sight of these cogent reasons and viewed the American participation 
in the war entirely in the light of a crusade for freedom and democracy. This 
popular emotion should not be unduly condemned or ridiculed. It was historic­
ally understandable that Americans, once they were challenged to build a better 
international order, would rely on those principles which for the first time in 
world history had made democracy a success on a continent-wide basis. 
No other political document could have offered as much guidance for the 
establishment of a peaceful international society as did the American constitu­
tion and Woodrow Wilson ably and eloquently projected the American politi­
cal tradition into a liberal international faith. The weakness of Wilson's inter­
national program lay in the generality of many of its tenets and also in con­
flicts among them. The principle of national self-determination, for example, 
was not everywhere applicable; in certain cases it conflicted with other Wilson-
ian principles like that of access to the sea for landlocked states. But the lac 
of absolute logical unity and adaptability to concrete issues could have been 
improved once the program was actually translated into action at the peace 
conference. . , 
More serious was Wilson's stubborn belief that his abstract ideals could 
blot out certain realities of political power. He was profoundly convinced that 
his international program, as embodied in the Fourteen Points and additional 
speeches expressed the longings of the common man all over the globe. This 
assumption was not altogether fallacious. The appeal of the Wilsonian ideas 
durin» World War I was great, and they contributed in a decisive manner tc 
the breakdown of enemy resistance. Moreover, in spite of the disappointments 
of the Paris settlement they became a powerful ferment of political thought 
and action. In some respects one could wish that American policy in World 
War II had hewn closer to the Wilsonian line, though it is undoubtedly true 
that the greater tactical skill of Roosevelt made possible the final realization of 
some of the Wilsonian ideals like the United Nations. 
The main criticism that can be levied against Wilson, the statesman, should 
not be directed against his program as such, but rather against his misunder-
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standing of the relationship between ideas and power in history. Wilson 
thought that the proclamation of the new international ideals would rally the 
common men everywhere to their support. In this sense he could say that only 
he and not Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and others represented the people. The 
major test of Wilson's assumption came when he appealed over the head of 
the Italian government to the Italian people for a modification of Italy's de­
mands for expansion and aroused a violent nationalistic reaction. The sovereign 
nation state was in full bloom and not likely to wither away under the impact 
of Wilson's ideals. In democratic terms Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and 
Orlando represented their peoples better than Wilson did. They had parlia­
mentary majorities behind them, while Wilson had lost control of Congress in 
the November elections, and it was doubtful what future American opposition 
his treaty might have to face. In retrospect it could be argued that Wilson 
wou have done better to rest his case before the American Senate and elec­
torate not exclusively on idealistic grounds but also on the American interest 
in the preservation of the balance of power which the Allied victory had 
create . His one-sided emphasis on world improvement gave many Americans 
the impression that Wilson had attended in Paris not to American needs but to 
esoteric objectives. 
If the League was to come into being its roots had to be planted deeply 
e soi of national security interests. Such policy required the frank rec­
ognition of the balance of power which Wilson rejected. In practice he could 
no help to make all sorts of concessions to the balance of power, but they 
ere usua y wrapped up in the language of some general principle. It would 
e een etter to call a spade a spade instead of getting lost in what hostile 
tics could label double-talk. Naturally, after all her losses France would not 
I n n r  T T  S C t t  e m e n t  t b a t  w o u J d  a l l o w  G e r m a n y  t o  r e n e w  t h e  w a r  b e f o r e  
as f-h* ft F ere Was n° reason to represent the stringent German disarmament 
nan w , P "V0 , disarmament> whkh> i" article 8 of the League Cove-
section nf H!TC m ta-T-e ^'ace 'n Porms very different from the disarmament 
bv beiW 8 CS featy' ^le ki&k Wilsonian principles suffered greatly 
sarv Teds" K )UStlfiCati°n °f ^ whkh Citable and neces 
rlLnce Thffh" l/r1 rdati°nshiPs' Thereby they lost much of their 
cNleTvelyTem " ̂  ̂  "*** beac0ns * solution a 
examplTTt IteTTT tremendous aPtitude vengeance. To give a recent 
Conference of 194^ th ^ COnference of World War II, the Moscow the ,u°.ted  ̂
tions I am nni democratic against totalitarian na­
tion, but i think TTtTeTigST of °dur wartime deaIings with the Soviet 
donable but also bound to produce as > T' " T Y mteIlectuaI1y unPar' 
P ' s it happened in this case, considerable 
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damage through confusion. With regard to the Paris treaties their weak and 
contradictory moral basis made people in later years unwilling to enforce them. 
Winston Churchill and Lloyd George have stated their opinions on the 
peace settlement of Paris. Both do not think that the peace makers of Paris 
should be blamed for the ultimate failure of the peace settlement. Both think 
that the statesmen of the inter-war period were responsible for the deterioration 
of international affairs which ushered in World War II. Lloyd George criticizes 
chiefly the lack of magnanimity in the revision of the peace treaties, and it 
should be mentioned that Lloyd George had been in favor of revising the draft 
treaty of Versailles in May and June of 1919. 
Churchill seems to agree with Lloyd George on these points, but he accuses 
the statesman of the inter-war period of negligence, because they squandered 
the powers which the peace settlement had deposited in them. No doubt the 
military superiority of Britain and France was safely established by the peace 
settlement. It has often been asserted, particularly during World War II, that 
the disarmament provisions of Versailles were faulty and permitted the Germans 
to rearm secretly. The Germans violated, indeed, the disarmament articles of 
the Versailles Treaty even before 1933- But modern war mobilization requires 
the total use of manpower and all industries. These measures were taken only 
by Hitler, and though they were taken quite openly Britain and France failed 
to intervene. Churchill is quite right in condemning British and French leaders 
for conceding freedom of armaments to Germany before her grievances had 
been allayed. He goes as far as to call the second World War "the unneces­
sary war." 
Churchill's judgment on the statesmen of the inter-war period is correct 
and nobody is better qualified to pronounce it than the man who was one of 
the very few people aware of the approaching catastrophe when not only Britain 
but also the world slept. But it does not offer an explanation of the historical 
forces which made possible the policies conducted by these statesmen with the 
assent of their nations. In my opinion, one of the main reasons must be found 
in the disregard of the realities of power which the peace conference of Paris 
initiated and in the indiscriminate use of high principles. When the League 
failed to gain strength and ultimately broke down as an instrument of interna­
tional policy, there was not even as much balance of power left as had existed 
in 1914. 
Wilson had proclaimed as early as January, 1917, that after the war there 
should be no "new balance of power" but a "community of power," yet the 
peace conference achieved neither. A community of power without balance of 
power would require universality and a spirit of cooperation founded on com­
mon ideals. But Russia was left outside the pale. I do not wish to suggest that 
a solution of the Russian problem would have been simple or even possible in 
1919. The French were stubbornly opposed to any diplomatic dealings with the 
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Bolshevists. They advocated intervention without, however, being able to indi­
cate the military means with which to stage a successful intervention. Winston 
Churchill, then British secretary of war, actively worked for intervention, but 
in the review of his actions in his memoirs of World War I he doubted himself 
whether the White-Russian elements deserved Allied support. 
Lloyd George was a non-interventionist as was Woodrow Wilson. Lloyd 
George considered that Allied intervention in Russia would be as self-defeating 
as foreign intervention in the French Revolution had been more than a century 
ago. He wanted to make diplomatic contacts with the Soviets. But in the end 
nothing decisive was done in any direction. 
When Lloyd George resumed his appeal for peaceful relations with the 
Soviet Union at the Conference of Genoa in 1922 it was already too late. 
Russia and Germany, the two chief opponents of the Paris settlements, came 
together and concluded the treaty of Rapallo. When Germany joined the 
League of Nations in 1926 she was exempted from League obligations in case 
the new League decided on sanctions against Russia and in a new treaty the 
Russo-German cooperation begun at Rapallo was further extended. 
From a historical point of view it is impossible to say what should have 
een done about the problem of Russia in 1919. But obviously the funda­
mental significance of the issue was gravely underrated, and none of the serious 
consequences of defaulting on it were foreseen. Probably it was inevitable in 
all circumstances that Moscow would set herself up as the world center oppos­
ing the rule of liberal-democratic principles, but these pretenses had to be 
ought by other than mere political weapons which we shall discuss a bit later. 
Russo-German collaboration after 1919 proceeded, however, less on the basis 
of ideological unity than of power politics. The chief supporters of the Russian 
orientation in Germany were the parties of the right and of the army, the 
sweir It goes without saying that the Communist party was, of course 
supporting usso-German collaboration and even more than that, the complete 
subordination of German policy under Moscow, but the German Communist 
exercised a" influence on the official conduct of German foreign 
nlar rl i collaboration between Germany and the Soviet Union 
states and°pC<l A ^ CaStern fnn«e of Eur0Pe. Finland, the Baltic 
from R . 0 aia > m a precarious position. That they had gained independence 
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Bolshevists. They advocated intervention without, however, being able to indi­
cate the military means with which to stage a successful intervention. Winston 
Churchill, then British secretary of war, actively worked for intervention, but 
in the review of his actions in his memoirs of World War I he doubted himself 
whether the White-Russian elements deserved Allied support. 
Lloyd George was a non-interventionist as was Woodrow Wilson. Lloyd 
George considered that Allied intervention in Russia would be as self-defeating 
as foreign intervention in the French Revolution had been more than a century 
ago. He wanted to make diplomatic contacts with the Soviets. But in the end 
nothing decisive was done in any direction. 
When Lloyd George resumed his appeal for peaceful relations with the 
Soviet Union at the Conference of Genoa in 1922 it was already too late. 
Russia and Germany, the two chief opponents of the Paris settlements, came 
together and concluded the treaty of Rapallo. When Germany joined the 
League of Nations in 1926 she was exempted from League obligations in case 
the new League decided on sanctions against Russia and in a new treaty the 
Russo-German cooperation begun at Rapallo was further extended. 
From a historical point of view it is impossible to say what should have 
been done about the problem of Russia in 1919. But obviously the funda­
mental significance of the issue was gravely underrated, and none of the serious 
consequences of defaulting on it were foreseen. Probably it was inevitable in 
all circumstances that Moscow would set herself up as the world center oppos­
ing the rule of liberal-democratic principles, but these pretenses had to be 
fought by other than mere political weapons which we shall discuss a bit later. 
Russo-German collaboration after 1919 proceeded, however, less on the basis 
of ideological unity than of power politics. The chief supporters of the Russian 
orientation in Germany were the parties of the right and of the army, the 
Reichswehr. It goes without saying that the Communist party was, of course 
supporting Russo-German collaboration and even more than that, the complete 
subordination of German policy under Moscow, but the German Communist 
party never exercised an influence on the official conduct of German foreign 
policy. 
But the political collaboration between Germany and the Soviet Union 
placed at once the states along the eastern fringe of Europe, Finland, the Baltic 
states, and Poland, in a precarious position. That they had gained independence 
from Russia in 1918 was due to the feats of the German arms in World War I 
in a ition to the subsequent collapse of Germany and Austria-Hungary 
as we as the alienation between the western powers and Russia, which was 
altogether one of the most amazing changes of the historical scene that ever 
appened in history. The French contributed at least to the preservation of the 
independence of the north-eastern European states by the mission of General 
Weygand to Warsaw at the time of the Russo-Polish war of 1920-21. His 
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advice helped to stall the Russian onslaught. But not even the greatest strategic 
genius could have changed the great military disequilibrium that developed in 
eastern Europe after 1921. Whatever might happen in the end on a world-wide 
plane, these small states were bound to suffer once the eastern great powers 
recovered. 
This applied also to the south-eastern European states, usually called the 
succession states to the Habsburg empire, though Rumania and Yugoslavia 
and also Poland derived only a part of their possessions from the Habsburgs. 
To conceive of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Poland as a replace­
ment of France's pre-World War I ally Russia, was rather injudicious. At best 
the worth of these states could have been measured by the services which the 
Habsburg empire had given to Germany during World War I, and they had 
not been too strong. The distribution of national sovereignty among a larger 
group of national states in this area was not likely to improve their military 
strength. As a matter of fact, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and pos­
sibly Poland these states were between 1919 and 1939 a liability to the western 
powers rather than an addition of strength. It should be remembered that the 
French had poured billions into Russia before 1914 to turn her into an effective 
military ally. They were unable to repeat this, since the loss of their loans to 
Russia had made the French rentier fearful of foreign investments. But without 
them these states, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, could never be strong 
military allies nor could they become democratic. Practically all of them soon 
turned into semi-authoritarian states. 
This leads us to another fundamental misreading of the new trends by 
the peacemakers of Paris. They were unprepared to face the impact of modern 
war on society. Broadly speaking, the wars of earlier times had been wars of 
armies—armies of restricted, if expanding, numbers limited in their techno­
logical equipment. But World War I had assumed a new and revolutionary 
character. Formerly the production of arms ceased when war broke out, but 
after 1916 industrial mobilization became as gigantic as the military levies. In 
other words, after 1916 World War I turned into the first modern total war 
changing, and in many instances revolutionizing, social habits and attitudes. 
The impact of this event was greatest in Russia, which tried but did not succeed 
in a total mobilization, and in Germany, which did succeed in achieving a rather 
complete government-directed war economy, the first planned economy, as a 
result of the Allied blockade and the demands of the front line. 
Nobody in Paris recognized that total war could only be cured by total 
diplomacy. Frontier regulations would not suffice to guarantee peace. Apart 
from political issues diplomacy would have to deal with economic, social, and 
ideological ones. The appearance of total war shocked many people, but most 
of them comforted themselves with the hope that there would be a restoration 
of the "normal" structure of societies and "normal" attitudes of their members. 
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This was probably the major reason that the statesmen of the period thought 
that a diplomatic peace would settle a war which actually had become a sort 
of world revolution. 
The peace treaties contained arrangements for political frontiers and some 
rather sketchy provisions for the military defense of the new order, but little 
beyond that. After the drafting and signing of the peace treaties public opinion 
in all Allied countries relapsed and demanded to go back to normalcy. This 
could mean, as it did in the case of the United States, almost complete with­
drawal from world politics. But as a sentiment it influenced even the European 
nations which remained active in the diplomatic field. The desire to have 
only a minimum of international organization in political, economic, and social 
affairs was noticeable everywhere. But peacemaking after a protracted total war 
could no longer be conducted in the forms of the traditional diplomatic confer­
ences. It called for an extension of diplomatic activity into new fields. 
Wilson was not unaware of the deep changes in the character of interna­
tional relations. He knew that the individual, from whom in modern politics 
the sanctioning force for any order must come, would not place his full faith 
in a collective system if it did not prove its worth in the economic and social 
fields as well. The peace conference tackled a number of social problems, but 
most of them were of a general humanitarian character and not of crucial 
significance in the social and economic life of the world. 
What would have been needed most was the restoration of a liberal world 
economy, but in this respect the peace conference failed completely. In the 
third of the Fourteen Points Wilson had demanded economic freedom, but this 
point had run into strong domestic opposition, and Wilson resigned himself to 
the situation. He was also not in a position to discuss at Paris a settlement of 
inter-Allied war debts, which aggravated the problem of German reparations. 
It is clear that the expectation of future German reparation payments which the 
French and British entertained at Paris in 1919 were fantastic, as John Maynard 
Keynes, who resigned from the British delegation, rightly predicted. But 
no ody would have set any exact figure of reparations or other big-scale inter­
national payments like the inter-Allied debts unless he knew something about 
t e uture of international trade. If the peacemakers had taken steps toward 
the expansion of international commerce, greater sums might have been trans­
ferred than actually were between 1919 and 1932. 
But nothing was undertaken to reestablish systematically the foundations 
ree world economy of the nineteenth century, and even less was done 
to expand world production and world trade. With the demand for extrava­
gant reparations and an unrealistic inter-Allied debt settlement the balance of 
international payments was entirely upset. From 1924 to 1931 American private 
oans enai e ermany to pay reparations, which then were used by the receiver 
part y or, as in the case of Britain, altogether for the payment of Ameri-
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can war debts. Winston Churchill has rightly called this system "insane. 
But the situation from 1919 to 1924 was worse and helped to breed all the 
anti-democratic forces of the right and left which after the great economic 
crisis of the early thirties were to undo the work of the peacemakers of 1919-
I am not contending that modern totalitarianism is only the outgrowth of 
economic tribulations. It appeared in the inter-war period only in countries 
with a strong tradition of autocracy. The anti-democratic forces were powerful 
in Germany, and it was to be expected that they would make a bid for return 
to internal and external power. The unsettled state of eastern and southeastern 
Europe gave them hope that the tables could be turned against the World War I 
allies, whose political cooperation after 1920 became strained or non-existent. 
There were also some sound German grievances, though fewer than were played 
up by German nationalistic propaganda, which enabled the German nation­
alists to keep German resentment against the peace settlement alive. 
But there existed in Germany in the twenties also a strong feeling against 
war and a majority opinion that a revision of the Versailles Treaty should be 
sought only by peaceful means. If earlier concessions had been made to these 
movements, and if on the other hand the stability of eastern and southeastern 
Europe had been strengthened, history might have taken a different course. But 
the international economic policies of the inter-war period finally turned central 
and eastern Europe into the anti-liberal camp. 
At the beginning of our discussion we compared the peace conferences 
of Vienna and Paris. The truth is that they cannot be compared. Vienna was 
the settlement of twenty-odd years of war in which the revolutionary forces had 
been able to modify but not overthrow the old order. In contrast the Paris 
Peace Conference was a first attempt to deal with the radically new situation 
which had manifested itself only in the course of World War I. Most people 
refused to recognize that World War I had brought about revolutionary changes 
in world politics and thought of the War as an unhappy event which would 
not exclude the return to normalcy or, to put it differently, to the pre-War 
conditions. Actually World War I created not only one world but also the 
absolute necessity for dealing with political issues in terms of total diplomacy. 
The second World War has driven home these points again apart from 
creating new problems. Still, after thirty-five years of international turmoil we 
have not reached a safe haven. No prediction can be made when we shall do 
so. But one thing we can say with confidence: All the sacrifices our soldiers 
make to establish a rule of law in this world will be in vain if we do not 
succeed in understanding the historic forces of our age, which will be judged 
by future generations according to our own achievements and failures. 
III. 
FROM INDIVIDUALISM TO COLLECTIVISM IN 
AMERICAN LAND POLICY 
BY PAUL WALLACE GATES 
In the course of the nineteenth century liberalism in America went through 
profound changes, its early attitudes and meanings being taken over by ele­
ments thoroughly conservative in character and its early supporters moving to 
policies that were quite the reverse of their previous position. In the early 
years of the century liberalism connoted equality of man, freedom of conscience, 
of speech, personal liberty, individualism. It also meant laissez faire policies 
on the part of the state, the removal of existing restrictions, class privileges, 
controls, prohibitions and monopolies. 
Following the Civil War these concepts, which we associate with the 
Je ersonian tradition, were assimilated by the rapidly emerging business inter­
ests an made to serve their purposes as protection against the new liberalism 
was demanding the policing of the corporations, trust busting, even gov­
ernment ownership. By the twentieth century Jefferson and the earlier con-
FL ^ ° e 1 erabsm ba<d been taken into camp by the defenders of business 
7 1CS 7 I re£arc'e^ themselves as carrying on the true liberal tradition.1 On 
e other hand a combination of western agrarians, labor leaders, middle class 
umanitarians and other critics of social institutions, having thrown off their 
e state, of big government, of the arbitrary bureaucrat were pushing 
\Y/L 7er TeaTnLg lntervention by government in the affairs of the people. 
Whatever their labels, the defenders of business were primarily concerned with 
reedom of opportunity unhampered by government restrictions and aided 
ever P°ssi e y government subsidies while the reformers, progressives or 
ew hberals breathed the humanitarian spirit of Jefferson but advocated realistic 
and forward looking government action to achieve a better life for the people. 
the de^°Crrt'C 17'V UahSm °f the nineteenth century was being replaced by 
the democratic collectivism of the twentieth century. ^ ^ 
0OT Twh!!iSt0ry °f Ajm7iCan knd P01^ reflects this transformation in ideol-
Zrtelth 7 ^ d ^ IiberaliSm in knd P01^ at beginning of the 
publ c ownerT"7 UnaCCePtabIe to the liberals of 1900 and the restrictions, 
cated wolld "o^h an7C°nt;° kd USe and development which the latter advo-
Cd W°Uld n0t haVC f0und favor -ith the earlier generation of liberals. It is 
supporteTs^of ''fL^Lrtrpdse-'rt^Sv 7 !^kOCa£\of laissez faire and later 
Ame"Can Co"^vatism and the Age of Enterprise McC1°skey 
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the object of this paper to trace the changes in the concept of liberalism in land 
policy and to show that they were the result, not of radical or socialistic theories 
imported as it were into the field of land policies, although these theories 
helped to bring about changes, but that fundamentally the new policies were 
the result of the hard practical experience of the American people. 
The objectives of colonial land policies were twofold: those pursued by 
the mother country and those pursued by influential individuals. Imperial 
policies as they were finally perfected were intended to permit a slow controlled 
advance westward and to treat the land as a permanent source of revenue under 
the quit rent system for the support of the colonial governments. These policies 
were wiped out by the Revolution. Meantime, prominent and influential indi­
viduals in the colonial period had attempted to establish for themselves great 
baronies over which they might rule, but the abundance of land, the individual­
ism and spirit of independence of the common people, and the comparative 
ease of squatting upon land without title made their path difficult. Confisca­
tion, abolition of primogeniture and entail and of other relics of medieval 
tenure, the emergence of a more democratic electorate, the low price and free 
grant policies of the states after the Revolution shattered their hopes. Never­
theless, the well born, the wealthy, the aggressive and ambitious did not give 
up trying to establish large estates. 
The new national land system, created to administer the public domain 
ceded by the states and later acquired from other countries, was framed in an 
era when liberal principles were not held in high repute. The old imperial 
policy of using the public land as a source of revenue became the basic prin­
ciple of the new land system, and the settlement of the west and the welfare 
of the settlers were subordinated to it. So long as the revenue concept domi­
nated our national land policies the various regulations adopted to develop 
that revenue as easily and as quickly as possible gave purchasers of large tracts 
advantages over the small buyer that for years enabled capitalist groups to act 
as middlemen in selling land and exacting profits from settlers. To begin with, 
half the land was to be sold in blocks of 5,120 acres and the other half in the 
alternate townships was to be divided into 640 acre sections and sold, the 
minimum price being $2 an acre. Credit was eventually extended but it only 
helped the capitalist to acquire more land. No restrictions of any kind were 
placed on the amount of land individuals or groups could buy from the gov­
ernment. Since the units of sale were much too large for him the pioneer 
settler was virtually denied an opportunity to acquire public lands and was 
obliged to go to the middleman who could purchase large tracts and retail them 
out in small pieces. 
In the second, fourth, and sixth decades of the nineteenth century occurred 
periods of great inflation produced by extravagant public spending on internal 
improvements with borrowed funds, unsound banking practices, including large 
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emissions of wildcat and shinplaster currency, unusually high commodity prices 
—cotton in 1818 and wheat in the fifties—war conditions abroad and prolif­
eration of railroad companies at home. Since almost unlimited credit was 
available for anyone of influence and property, land values were rising rapidly 
and there developed a scramble for public lands that reached its greatest excite­
ment in Alabama in 1818, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Mississippi in 1835-
1836, and Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa and Missouri in the fifties. By a conserva­
tive estimate it appears that 5,000,000 acres in the second decade, 25,000 000 
in the thirties and 40,000,000 in the fifties were bought by land companies 
and individual capitalists that thus came to control whole townships and large 
parts of counties.2 
Some of this speculative ownership was not firm or stable. During the 
periods of depression that soon followed each era of inflation many land holders 
were frozen out by increasing tax and interest costs which they were unable to 
bear, but others, who had not so overextended, managed to carry their invest­
ment for many years in the hope of receiving their anticipated profits. There 
was thus established in all the better parts of the middle west and Gulf states 
absentee ownership which contributed nothing to develop either the lands or 
the communities in which they were located. The owners only waited for the 
increase in value which settlers on neighboring tracts would create by the labor 
ey performed in making improvements and constructing roads, churches, and 
om °n! u Wlt ° t*'e'r *and ^r0m development the speculators retarded 
growth, kept out settlers who could not pay their price, and gave to areas con-
tors deserts Paft & °Wned Iand tHe rePutation of heing specula­
tors anrl rt,eC°n<^arj d's("nbul:'on wdd or unimproved land by these specula­
te 163 -afntS WaS the biSSest business on the frontier. Much 
ficiarv was eu W£^S P[°V1 ed by tbe east but not infrequently the principal bene-
Tuscaloosa rl i m ChiIIk°the' Vin™> Chocchuma, 
IIlectons A U T t *** ** ̂  r£nted to ^e sales and 
I860 Z r f and S°Id °n ^ °Wn aCCOunt- ManP years later, in 
InuXldZh' £°mm!nting °n th£ eXaCti0ns of the ™iddle men who 
TZstt fS I"'?/11' IeSOld t0 th£m at hiSh P-es on credit with 
for lands two and" Trt ^ f°r d°IIar paid into the PubIic treasur}' 
"dS tW° and a half 0r three dollars had gone to the land dealers.2 
Northern Land" Before' War*"ST PaU/ Gates "Southern Investments in 
155-185; "Land Policy and TenanTv in ihTvf-°f V <MaV> 1939b 
tory, I (May, 1941), 60-82- "The Role ( t'6 jtates> Journal of Economic His-
ment," Pennsylvania Magazine oi hliP the Land Speculator in Western Develop-
and "Land Policy and Ten'n^nlhep'auie cTfh IF* 1942>> Pa«es 314-333; 
of Hi story, XXXV (March, 1939) ,1-26 Counties of Indiana," Indiana Magazine 
™ Semi-Weekly Tribune, January'31, 1860. 
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Not all this land that was bought by easterners in large quantities was 
acquired for mere speculation. A considerable number of easterners like Henry 
L. Ellsworth of Connecticut, Daniel Webster, James Wadsworth of the Gen­
esee Valley of New York, planned to establish large estates operated by tenants 
in the midst of whom they would live as country gentry. Ellsworth and others 
like him moved to their holdings and devoted their energies to improving, 
developing and settling them, not always with success, however.4 
Far the larger part of the 70,000,000 acres acquired in extensive holdings 
was bought for the expected rise in land values by speculators who had no 
intention of investing anything more than the cost of the land and management. 
The intrusion of these speculators between the government and the actual set­
tlers in the primary disposition of its lands won increasing disapproval, both 
in the west and in the east. Westerners without capital but anxious to own 
land contemplated with bitterness the extensive tracts owned by absentees who 
contributed nothing to their development, but insisted on withholding them 
from sale and use until they would bring a profitable return. In their dislike 
of absentee owners the westerners took pleasure in stealing their timber, pastur­
ing livestock on their grass, and assessing their land at high valuations. Since 
the distribution of the public lands in their midst was a government matter, 
they turned to politics for relief from the unwanted speculator. They petitioned 
Congress, the president, the General Land Office, to grant them the right of 
preemption which would enable them to get in ahead of the speculator, then 
to postpone the land sales which would put off the day when they had either 
to pay for their claims or see them purchased by speculators at the auction, to 
reduce the price of land, and finally and most important, to grant land without 
cost to actual settlers. They formed claim or squatter associations to intimidate 
by mass threat possible buyers of their improved claims. Western representa­
tives and senators took up their pleas and pressed them with increasing vigor 
in Congress. 
It was not only at the speculator with his large holdings that western 
resentment was directed but increasingly the government was being charged 
with profiting from the labor of the pioneer in augmenting or creating land 
values. Long before Henry George shook the foundations of the citadel erected 
by the industrial barons on the twin doctrines of laissez faire and Social Dar­
winism by calling for the single tax the west had reached the pragmatic view 
that unimproved land on the frontier had no value. Only through the coming 
of the settlers who cleared, fenced and broke the land, erected their homes and 
laid out roads and established schools, churches and local government was 
4 For Ellsworth, one of the largest buyers of western land but who ultimately failed in 
his goal to establish a great and long lasting estate, see Paul Wallace Gates, "Land 
Policy and Tenancy in the Prairie Counties of Indiana, Indiana Magazine of History, 
XXXV (March, 1939), 6 S. The most successful and largest farming estate in 
America that was acquired from the United States and developed through tenants, that 
of William Scully, is described in the same author's Frontier Landlords and Pioneer 
Tenants (Ithaca, 1945), pp. 34-63. 
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value given to land. The government, thought the west, like speculators, 
gained the unearned increment by charging a high price which came out of the 
sweat and toil of the pioneers.5 For his boldness in striking into new and 
previously untouched territory, his willingness to undergo great hardships and 
to deprive his family of the amenities of a well established society, he should 
be rewarded, not penalized, by being permitted to enjoy the full benefits of his 
action in developing new communities. He should be given the land, not sold 
it at high prices. 
In the east the organizers of the struggling labor parties took up the cry 
of land reform in the hope of providing an outlet for the unemployed and a 
program economically attractive to them. The intellectual leader who framed 
the reform demands and worked out their philosophical justification was George 
Henry Evans, borrowing from Thomas Skidmore. As editor of radical weeklies, 
as lecturer, pamphleteer and leader in trade union activities, Evans drew atten­
tion to the land question as a major issue of the day. He maintained that the 
use and ownership of land was a natural right as land provided the basis of 
living. To guarantee that right, the public domain should be distributed freely 
in small tracts to its users. The right of alienation should not accompany the 
right of use, argued Evans, for only by preventing the sale on mortgage of 
homesteads and denying the right of inheritance could land be prevented from 
accumulating in the hands of a few.6 
Here then is a combination of western pragmatic reasoning and eastern 
philosophical support for land reform. Horace Greeley, never one to spurn 
radical ideas, took over the reform program of Evans and documented it lav-
15 Y y accounts in the New York Tribune of his experiences and observations 
gathered on his trips through the west. Contemporaries were shown the harsh­
ness of frontier life among settlers who were desperately seeking to make farms 
or themselves on lands for which they had had to pay outrageously high prices 
t ey a bought from speculators or for which, whether acquired from 
previous owners or from the government they had used funds borrowed at usury 
rates that ran as high as 120 and 150% a year.? 
ref°rrners cry for a liberal land policy that would prevent land mon-
po y an permit the pioneer, the farm maker on the frontier to acquire 
ownership of his land without having to pay for the increased value his and 
neighborhood improvements gave to it gained support in high places. In Con-
which he ex­pounded in pL?f°'/tiCa!/ ec?no.!?ist, held this same view  
As a widely read man hts viewfmavW Tl (^"^elphia, 1848), pp. 60-61 
policies that was shown by eastern congressmen t0 SUPP°rt f°r fiee laIK 
Jos JhDorfm?n"The°Ec'onZ"c Mindif^ <New York> 19411 1946), 684-85. Mind in American Civilization, II (New York 
Agricultural History,^wSjanuSySl933)"^ 18^°™ ^ UnemPloyment. 1837-1862,' 
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gress Thomas Hart Benton, Andrew Johnson, George W. Julian and others 
took up the issue, arguing for general preemption, reduction in price, free 
lands, and restrictions on speculative purchasing. Andrew Jackson was the first 
and in effect the only president who advocated drastic reform of government 
land policy so that the public domain would be reserved for actual settlers. In 
his annual message on the state of the Union in December, 1832, he stated his 
belief that it was the labor of the "adventurous and hardy population of the 
West" which "gives real value to the land." He urged abandonment of the 
sales policy with its high minimum price and the substitution of a policy of 
charging actual settlers a fee just sufficient to cover the cost of survey and 
management.8 No legislation followed his recommendation and in 1836 Jack­
son returned to the fray, this time with positive action. 
The country, particularly the west, was caught up in a frenzy of land 
speculation in which government sales had skyrocketed from an average of 
2,000,000 to 4,000,000 acres a year to 20,000,000 in 1836. In 1835 and 1836 
alone probably 22,000,000 to 25,000,000 acres were purchased for speculation.9 
Himself a speculator in public lands in the past Andrew Jackson knew full well 
the dangers from such large scale monopolization by a few hundred or thousand 
speculators. In June, 1836, he issued his famous Specie Circular that by requir­
ing the payment of gold or silver instead of bank notes for public lands effec­
tively halted the wild orgy of land speculation.10 The Circular, Jackson said 
later, had "measurably cut off the means of speculation and retarded its prog­
ress in monopolizing the most valuable of the public lands. It had tended to 
save the new states from a nonresident proprietorship, one of the greatest ob­
stacles to the advancement of a new country and the prosperity of an old one. 
It has tended to keep open the public lands for entry by emigrants at Govern­
ment prices instead of their being compelled to purchase of speculators at 
double or triple prices.11 
8 James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II (!904), 601. 
9 My estimate is based on analysis of the sales for early years together with those of 
1835 and 1836. Although I have worked through all the land entry books for this 
period I have not made a detailed investigation to determine the actual amount of land 
bought by non-settlers. Thomas Ewing, Senator from Ohio, estimated that about 
20,000,000 acres were purchased by speculators in 1835 and 1836. Apparently he 
thought of speculative purchasing as including only those large tracts bought by men 
of wealth or by land companies. For Ewing's estimates see Congressional Globe, 24 
Cong., 2 Sess,, Appendix, p. 289. 
10 For the Circular which was actually issued by Levi Woodbury, Secretary of the Treas­
ury, see American State Papers, Public Lands, VIII, 910. 
11 Annual Message to Congress, December 5, 1836, in Richardson, III, 249-50. The 
House of Representatives had previously provided for an investigation of the amount 
of borrowing by members of Congress and other government officials from deposit 
banks for speculation in public lands. A comprehensive investigation might have been 
salutary for there is plenty of evidence of prominent members of Congress buying pub­
lic lands in large quantities but the efforts of the House Committee to secure evidence 
were fruitless. Congressional Globe, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 609-10, July 2, 1836; 
House Reports, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 846, pp. 1-6. 
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Jackson s vigorous championship of land reform was followed by a strong 
effort in Congress to halt speculative purchasing and "limit sales to settlers or 
cultivators or, as Robert J. Walker, Senator from Mississippi put it, "to arrest 
monopolies of the public lands." With prophetic insight Walker predicted that 
the accumulation of land by capitalists for speculation would "introduce into 
the new states, the system of landlord and tenant, by which the occupant will 
not be the owner of the soil he cultivates, but the tributary of some absentee 
landlord, who will, in the shape of an annual rent, reap nearly all the profits of 
the labor of the cultivator. A measure to limit sales to actual settlers was 
fiercely opposed by eastern conservatives who continued to look upon the public 
lands as a national treasure which should provide income for the government 
and thereby reduce the need for taxes. Nothing should be permitted to inter­
fere with the free flow of sales and of resultant income. To these opponents 
of land reform the Walker-Jackson plan was radical, levelling, and democratic. 
It would make ownership for the poor and landless too easy, would drain off 
the laborers from the older areas and reduce land values there, and would 
accelerate the growth of the west unduly and thereby upset the political balance 
of power. Against the reform measure was employed every possible praliamen-
tary maneuver and delaying tactic but almost solid western support carried it 
through the Senate. In the House, where western influence was weaker, it was 
defeated.12 Not for years was another effort to be made to bar speculators from 
purchasing public lands. 
The land reformers welcomed the Specie Circular as a blow to the devel­
opment of land monopoly but felt let down by Congress which failed to act 
upon Jackson's request for protection against speculative purchases. Was not 
the government the greatest land monopolist and land speculator and a profiteer 
from the labor of frontiersmen whose painful advances westward gave value to 
the public lands? Did not a truly liberal land policy call for the abandonment 
o the revenue concept and the adoption of a free homestead plan and the rapid 
transfer of the public domain to private hands ? Step by step the country inched 
nearer these goals, although the revenue concept, while it ceased to be predomi­
nant, was never to be completely abandoned. In 1841 the Preemption Law 
gave settlers the right to move upon and improve surveyed public land from 
which they might with good luck make the necessary funds to purchase it 
wit out competitive bidding for $1.25 an acre. Only 160 acres could be acquired 
in this way. In 1847-55 Congress gave enlisted men in the Mexican War and 
veterans of all previous wars who had not been rewarded with land bounties 
warrants entitling them to 160 acres of the public lands. These warrants were 
vi ually land office money but they were issued in such quantities—altogether 
Trê onll & lole? 4 C o n g  ^ S e s s  ° 1 ° ^ J , a n u a %  1 4 >  1 8 3 ? >  i s  i n  Con-
consideration from December ifiu'ihuu l67'170- The measure was under 
1837' and be followed in the 
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they covered more than 61,000,000 acres—that they sold at prices ranging 
from 50 cents to $1.10 per acre. Most entries were made with the warrants 
since they were available everywhere at quoted rates and the effect of their issue 
was to reduce the cost of public land. In 1854 the Graduation Act reduced the 
price of land not newly brought into market from $1.25 an acre in proportion 
to the length of time it had been subject to sale, the lower limit being 12y2c. 
Only 320 acres could be acquired legally by any individual under this measure. 
Finally, in 1862, after a bitter struggle with the south, free homesteads of 
160 acres were offered to anyone who would settle upon and improve govern­
ment land. 
Greeley's agitation and western yearning for free grants had convinced 
the Republicans that the issue could win many votes and it did. During the 
next decades their stand upon the homestead issue paid the party political 
dividends. What were then frontier states like Wisconsin, Minnesota, Kansas, 
Iowa, and later Nebraska were so angered by Democratic President Buchanan's 
veto of a homestead bill and by the insistence of his administration on forcing 
lands on the market in the depression days of 1858-1860 as a means of raising 
revenue to balance the budget, thereby forcing thousands of impoverished set­
tlers to purchase their claims with money borrowed of loan sharks, that they 
turned to the Republican Party with majorities that surpassed the support it 
had anywhere else.13 
The philosophy behind the Homestead Act of 1862 was not the natural 
rights argument of Evans and the land reformers. Few could regard Wade or 
Chandler or Pomeroy or Morrill as radicals. Yet they pushed to adoption a 
measure that was comparable to the capitalization and distribution of the 
national forests, parks, dams, generating plants, mineral reserves and gold in 
Fort Knox of today. The free grant policy was based on the assumption that 
the cost of farm making, of pioneering on the prairies and plains was so great 
that few people could succeed in the process if they had to buy the land from 
the government. The Republicans seem to have come to the view that land 
itself had no value; that what value it had when made into farms was to be 
attributed to the labors of the farm maker. To this extent, at least, the land 
reformers' views prevailed. But the Republicans threw aside all other aspects 
of Evans' and Greeley's reforms. There were no restrictions on the alienation 
of homesteads after the title had passed, no limitations on the amount of land 
that could be acquired from the government, no repeal of the cash sale law 
with the right of unrestricted purchase of public lands, no withdrawal of lands 
from unlimited purchase, no steps taken to confiscate large holdings except the 
punitive measures directed against the Rebels, no safeguards to prevent accumu­
lation of new estates. 
13 Paul W. Gates, "The Struggle for Land and the 'Irrepressible Conflict' ", Political 
Science Quarterly, LXVI (June, 1951), 248-71. 
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But free land to the landless was scarcely the great gift that apologists for 
the homestead measure maintained. A major limitation upon its effectiveness 
was that at the very time it was adopted Congress was engaged in giving well 
over 100,000,000 acres of the public lands to projected or prospective railroads 
to aid in their construction. Also Congress continued the practice of granting 
to the states on their admission into the Union from six to sixteen per cent of 
their total area to aid in establishing and endowing common schools, universi­
ties, asylums, hospitals and penitentiaries. Both railroads and states were ex­
pected to sell their land at the highest price it would bring and at the minimum 
of $3 to $10 an acre. Such prices brought it about that much of the land was 
withheld from market and development for years and was ultimately sold on 
long term credit which was close to rent. The states thus found themselves 
dealing with the unpleasant task of collecting from numerous debtors or renting 
their land. The railroads when they ran into difficulty with their numerous 
land purchasers over collections were only too glad to shift the debt to local 
banks which were not quite so vulnerable politically. 
Both railroads and states assured, by virtue of the withdrawal of the lands 
from market for a time until they were in demand at the price they sought, 
that neighboring settlers through the work they did in farm making, road 
construction, payment of taxes for the establishment of schools and other gov­
ernment services created a good share of the value these lands acquired. In 
continuing the donation plan until the admission of Arizona and New Mexico 
in 1911 Congress not only withdrew 170,000,000 acres from access to home­
steaders but assured the continuation of the revenue policy over this large area 
and contributed to the development of tenancy. Liberal eastern thought and 
western agrananism had won a victory over the reactionary forces that wished 
to retain all the public lands as a major source of revenue, but it was only a 
partial victory and the campaign for reform in the American pattern continued.!" 
During and immediately after the Civil War the Radical Reconstructionists 
w o were neither radical nor in the proper sense reconstructionists, but on the 
contrary concerned to further the growth of big business, for a time joined with 
land reformers in supporting a truly radical program of land reform. The 
reason for this queer partnership was the hatred entertained by the Wade, 
Chandler, Morrill, Trumbull group of "Radicals" for the southern planters 
Wui° ra ominated national politics for so long and who were held respon-
(S, e °r ' e ^ar" s(:r!ke at them the "Radicals" proposed to confiscate 
dr P^ntatl0ns and other land holdings and to divide them among the freed-
men Confiscation measures were written into law which, if tolerated by the 
courts and vigorously enforced might have brought about a revolution in land 
ownership in the south. This same group put through Congress the Southern 
Historical Review, XLI InCOngruous Land System," American 
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Homestead Act of 1866 restricting the transfer of public lands to private own­
ership. Under this measure public land in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Lou­
isiana and Mississippi could be acquired by homesteaders only and until 1868 
in units no larger than 80 acres. True, there was no restriction on alienability 
but with that exception the radical views of Evans seem to have prevailed for 
the southern states. 
Little benefit came to tenants or land seekers in the south from the confis­
cation acts or the Southern Homestead Act. The former were not vigorously 
enforced, little land was recovered and no supplementary legislation was enacted 
which would have assured its redistribution on a democratic basis. The 
47,726,851 acres in the five southern states which were withdrawn from specu­
lative purchasing seem to have been heavily timbered land that would require 
much capital to improve and for whose principal resources there was but slight 
demand in the ten years in which the Southern Homestead Act was in opera­
tion. The repeal of the act in 1876 ended this venture.15 
By 1870 the west was repenting of the liberality of the land grants it had 
advocated and of the ease with which large individuals and corporate purchases 
could be made from the government. All over the newly developing frontier 
communities were signs that the land system was not working well from the 
point of view of the poor immigrant searching for land. Large railroad, state 
and private holdings were kept out of cultivation and use for years because of 
the insistence on holding them for high prices. Settlers buying from these 
holders almost invariably had difficulty in meeting their payments and at the 
same time buying farm machinery, livestock, constructing their homes, fencing 
the land and making other necessary improvements. Mortgage indebtedness 
was extensive, the interest rates were high, and foreclosures common, espe­
cially in periods of poor crops or low prices. Tenancy was appearing everywhere 
in the corn belt and wheat belt, half the farms in some counties being owned 
by absentees drawing their rents. Although the statistics of tenancy were not 
to be collected by the Census Bureau until 1880 no observer could be ignorant 
of its extent. 
It was at this time that Henry George let loose his first blast against the 
government land system and the means it provided for the accumulation of 
large estates in the hands of the wealthy. His Our Land and Land Policy was 
no dull esoteric discussion of rent, capital and labor but was a flaming indict­
ment and by all odds the best contemporary survey of the effect of the Federal 
land system in the distribution of ownership. Railroad land grants were de­
nounced as "reckless prodigality," "land grabbers were called the curse of the 
country, the story of the Mexican land claims in California were described as 
"a history of greed, of perjury, of corruption, of spoilation and high-handed 
15 Paul W. Gates, "Federal Land Policy in the South, 1866-1888," Journal of Southern 
History, VI (August, 1941), 303-30. 
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robbery, for which it will be difficult to find a parallel." The land system was 
declared to enable "speculators to rob settlers." "Was there ever national 
blunder so great—ever national crime so tremendous as our in dealing with our 
land?" George asked.16 His indictment was exaggerated, small ownerships were 
being established, all farmers in the newer areas were not suffering in the 
clutches of the money monster. George's critique contained much truth; more 
important, it challenged attention, and contributed mightily to the demand for 
reform. 
For the remainder of the century the land reformers, in harmony with the 
growing anti-monopoly movement in the west, tried to prevent Congress from 
making additional grants of land to railroads, to secure the forfeiture of un­
earned land grants to require the railroads to sell their lands at current market 
values, rather than to continue withholding them for high prices, to prohibit 
the accumulation of public land by aliens and to require the breakup of large 
estates held by them, to end the cash sale law of 1820 which permitted unre­
stricted purchasing of "offered" land, and to introduce into the General Land 
Office and the courts a more "settler minded" attitude and to eliminate there­
from the influence of railroad and mining companies and cattle and timber 
barons. 
The reformers, still a combination of eastern laborers and western agrarians, 
put a halt to further land grants in 1871. Between 1867 and 1894 their pres­
sure led to the forfeiture of 34,530,183 acres previously given railroads but 
which were unearned. They forced the land grant railroads to speed up their 
advertising and sales policy to hasten the transfer of their holdings into private 
hands where they would be taxable. In 1916 they were responsible for the 
recovery of nearly 3,000,000 acres long since given the Oregon and California 
Railroad but not sold, as the grant provided, for $2.50 an acre. Pressure by 
the reformers also galvanized the General Land Office into action which should 
have been taken much earlier to restore to entry lands withdrawn to permit the 
railroads to make their selections. At least 31,000,000 acres were thus restored 
to entry.1" State after state and the Federal Government placed restrictions on 
the right of aliens to acquire and hold lands. Finally, in 1891, the cash sale 
law was repealed, thereby ending the right of unlimited purchase of "offered" 
lands. To make the General Land Office more "settler minded" was less easy 
to achieve. In the Cleveland administration there was a definite change of 
USt^SilPul^letA ̂ Se title -Was °ur Und and L**d Policy, National and 
under the Hrle n »ln jan jrfnCIjC?, in 1871. I have used the more accessible reprint 
under the title Our Land and Land Policy (New York, 1901), pp. 21, 39 and 89. 
17 wants ™daUf7nrhelliSr haS t0ld t5 uSt0Iy °f the fight for the forfeiture of unearned 
articles• The^ Fnrfe r "Tn °f ^ °reg0n and California lands in two admirable 
Historical Iview XXX1U £^946*)M"sisfPJ Xdle? 
Gfeal }*66-WA^' Pa«fc Northwest Quarterly"XXXIX (October! 
Grants " MiXuihhi T/Hl2°sr , ,le'n Commissioner Sparks and the Railroad Land 
' " Valley Historical Review, XXV (September, 1938), 211-30. 
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attitude but it was soon offset by later appointments. Outwardly, at least, the 
officers deemed it essential to express concern about settler interests and to ask 
Congress for reform in the laws. 
These were notable victories which on the surface looked truly important. 
They came only after long agitation and continued hard work on the part of 
men such as George W. Julian, William S. Holman, Henry George, and 
Terrence V. Powderly. The Grangers, the Greenback Party, the Anti-Monop­
oly Party, the Populists, labor organizations and even the old line Republican 
and Democratic Parties all had a share in these reforms. But the reforms came 
late when much of the first rate land had passed into the hands of speculators 
and railroads, when the best of the redwood lands of California, the Douglas 
Fir land of Washington, and the long leaf pine land of the south were in the 
hands of the lumber barons, when the copper, iron, and oil bearing land were 
held by capitalistic combinations. Private ownership the west had favored and 
steps which hastened the transfer from government hands were continually 
being pushed by it. 
Essentially the reform or liberal position on the land question thus far had 
been to make the public land system function in a democratic way by assuring 
the small man the right to acquire a piece of the national domain. Limitations 
were put in the Preemption, the Graduation, the Homestead Acts and their 
variations to make certain that only the small man could take advantage of them 
until the issue of the patent, but beyond that they had no effect. All such 
measures were therefore used by large interests acting through dummy entry 
men" to acquire lands they could not legally acquire otherwise. Timber land 
in Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and Washington, grazing lands in Colo 
rado, Wyoming, Arizona, and Idaho, wheat lands in Kansas, Nebraska, North 
and South Dakota passed into the hands of great lumber companies, cattle com 
panies, and bonanza farm groups under laws that were designed to prevent 
large scale accumulation. The unwillingness of Congress to experiment with 
restrictions on alienation made inevitable the concentration of ownership which 
grieved western agrarians. 
Evans, Greeley, George, and other radicals had failed to carry the mass 
of land reformers with them on the question of alienability. Americans found 
it easy to be radical or to favor reform when to do so did not impose any self 
limitation, but few were attracted to any idea that might restrict their right to 
accumulate property or to sell and gain the unearned increment. 
With the larger and more valuable part of the public lands in private 
hands the reforms which were being adopted at this late time were both ineffec 
tive and to some extent unwise. Since the desirable size for land use units was 
increasing as population moved into the arid and semi-arid regions the 320 acre 
limitation on the amount of government land persons could acquire compelled 
either evasion and abuse of the laws to acquire adequately sized units or the 
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establishment of small grain farms in areas unsuited to cultivation. This pat­
tern of evasion and abuse of the land laws and the establishment of small grain 
farms in areas better planned by nature for grazing carried well into the twen­
tieth century. Not until 1934 were comprehensive and far reaching reforms 
initiated to produce a desirable and constructive plan of land use. 
The preponderant, almost the universal view of Americans until near the 
end of the nineteenth century was that the government should get out of the 
land business as rapidly as possible by selling or giving to settlers, donating for 
worthy purposes and ceding the lands to the states which should in turn pass 
them swiftly into private hands. No matter how badly owners abused their 
holdings through reckless cultivation, destructive and wasteful cutting of the 
timber, prodigal and careless mining for coal and drilling for oil, few ques­
tioned their right to subject their property to any form of use or abuse. An 
extensive part of the fertile coastal plain and piedmont of the south and of the 
hill farming area of the northeast could be cultivated in such a way as to re­
duce the land to barren, gullied, and eroded tracts no longer able to produce 
crops, to support families and to carry their share of community costs but few 
denied the right of the owners to do as they wished with their property or, 
more fundamentally, questioned the system of land distribution that seemed to 
invite such practices. The shore line of the Atlantic, of bays and inlets, of 
inland lakes all near congested urban areas could be monopolized by a wealthy 
few and still there were few complaints. Rich landlords, speculators and cor­
porations could buy unlimited amounts of land from the United States, or 
purchase from other owners who had acquired tracts from the state or federal 
government and keep their holdings from development for years, thereby blight­
ing whole areas, delaying the introduction of schools and roads and doing 
immeasurable harm to neighboring residents. The right of private property 
seemed virtually unlimited, so far had American individualism gone.18 Our 
Landed Heritage, to borrow Robbins' title, was expendable.19 
Long before the Civil War agricultural authorities were expressing alarm 
at the destructive farm practices employed in the tobacco and cotton fields of 
the south and the wheat land of the north but their remedy was education 
through farmers periodicals, societies, fairs, and the press. Undoubtedly edu­
cation was helpful 20 but on the frontier where land was cheap and labor scarce, 
where capital to meet the costs of farm making had usually to be borrowed at 
high rates, where the most profitable cash crop had to be produced year in and 
year out there was no alternative. Soil mining continued from frontier to 
frontier but, unfortunately, it carried over into later periods when pioneer con-
an^restrictions^6 ^r°m tb'S Sacralization urban property which was subject to controls 
" 1942)M' R°bbinS' °Ur Landed Heritage. The Public Domain, 1776-1936 (Princeton 
2 0  ( U r b a n ! , ^ 9 2 6 "  *  F * " ° f  'he A«"cultural History °f Virginh 
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editions had passed. Landlordism and tenancy, absentee ownership, and the 
financial and economic ills into which agriculture fell in the late nineteenth 
century all contributed to the cropping of tobacco, cotton, corn, and wheat too 
steadily in areas to which they were adapted. Diminishing yields, the ravages 
of insects which the continued cultivation of one crop encouraged, and eco­
nomic necessity forced changes and some improvements but in many areas the 
process of exhausting the soil continued. Not from agriculture, despite its ills, 
was to come the cry for a fundamental change in land use and ownership.21 
The serious economic losses to the nation resulting from the abuse of the 
soil were subtle, slow and cumulative in their effects. The ravaging of our 
natural resources by the lumber industry was obvious to all. Large scale com­
mercial lumbering at this time consisted of the cutting and removing of choice 
white pine in the easiest and cheapest ways possible without regard to protect­
ing remaining trees like Norway, hemlock, spruce, and the hardwoods. Much 
good timber was destroyed in the cutting and much when cut was left in the 
woods to rot. The tops and branches when dry easily caught fire which, with 
right conditions, could easily destroy the standing timber. When lumbermen 
were finished with an area its natural beauty had been destroyed and the slash 
remained to menace surrounding timber and settlements. Persons seeking 
recreation in forested areas like the Adirondacks of New York, the Alleghanies 
of Pennsylvania, the White Mountains of New Hampshire watched with in­
creasing dismay the encroachments of the lumbermen on the areas they loved. 
Early depletion of commercial timber in the more accessible areas forced lum­
bermen to move into the higher parts of the mountains, the upper reaches of 
the streams, into the areas where logs could not be floated cheaply to mill by 
water but had to be hauled on sleds or brought to the mill by expensive logging 
railroads. The increasing cost of lumber brought home to many people, espe­
cially in the older centers where the supply was being exhausted, the desirability 
of a more conservative and intelligent use of natural resources and the need 
for the adoption of reforestation policies. Lumbermen with their eye on the 
balance sheet were not sufficiently concerned to do anything at the time but an 
aroused public, working through forestry and science associations, called for a 
reorganization of our timberland disposal policy as a first step toward conser­
vation and providing for future needs.22 
21 None of the major works on agrarian discontent in the late nineteenth century include 
any critical analysis of government land policies and the part they played in aggravat­
ing the farmers' problems. For the fierce resentment at large estates that led to the 
adoption of anti-alien landowning measures by the United States and a number of 
middle western states see Paul W. Gates, Frontier Landlords and Pioneer Tenants, 
49-61. 
22 John Ise, The United States Forest Policy (New Haven, 1920), passim, is excellent 
for the beginning of the conservation movement. Richard G. Lillard, The Great Forest 
(New York, 1947), is useful for its account of the monopolistic practices of the lum­
bermen and the way they brought ruin to areas of superlative natural beauty. Cf. 
Agnes M. Larson, History of the White Pine Industry in Minnesota (Minneapolis, 
1949). 
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Support for a new plan of land administration came not only from the 
lovers of wildlife, recreation interests, professional forestry people, and univer-
sity professors but also from business men. Builders, contractors, real estate 
agents, even lumbermen and dealers in stumpage were concerned. We know, 
for example, that one of the largest dealers in timber lands and stumpage in 
Wisconsin was an ardent supporter of the conservation movement.23 Those 
diverse interests center their attention upon two principal proposals: (1) that 
the government retain control of its timber land and sell only under careful 
restrictions the stumpage, that is the right to cut, and not the land; (2) that 
the government should not only carefully supervise cutting on the forest reserves 
but should provide for the regeneration of cutover areas and the protection of 
the forests from fire and disease. 
The movement for the permanent withdrawal of timber lands from market 
and their establishment in organized forest reserves was taken up principally 
by congressmen from the older states in which the lumber industry was waning 
or where the higher costs of timber were affecting building development. The 
most active political support came from John Sherman of Ohio, George F. 
Edmunds of Vermont, and from other congressmen principally from Ohio, 
Indiana, Illinois, and New York. For continued and permanent public owner­
ships of the reserves and public controls, possibly even government lumbering, 
there was no great support in the Senate, perhaps not in the House. Yet an 
amendment providing for reservations when attached to an omnibus bill to 
restrict land entries and repeal the preemption and timber culture acts, was 
approved by Congress in 1891 without a division in either house. By a series 
of fortuitous circumstances, including adroit leadership, forest reserves were 
authorized almost a generation before Congress was "fully converted to the 
principle" underlying them.24 
The new forest policies involved a sharp break with the philosophy on 
which American land policy had thus far rested, that is that the government 
should not be in the business of purveying land any longer than necessary, that 
it should provide for the easy and early transfer of the public lands to private 
ownership, that it should not attempt to make gain from their disposal, that it 
should not retain from private ownership any part thereof, or attempt to reserve 
to itself royalty rights, rents, or other benefits. 
Although that staunch old advocate of land reform, William S. Holman 
of Indiana, firmly supported the change, the real impetus for it had not come 
from the land reformers of the past, nor from farm organizations or trade 
«and ^"whrtp^inp TCl tnam wIl0?e. estimates of the remaining commercial 
as to give a hm hnnst f t s as. Published in the Census of 1880 were so low 
Paul W Gates The Wi slur"Page prices from which he was a major beneficiary. 
Paul W. Gates, The Wtsconstn Pmelands of Cornell University (Ithaca, 1943), 226-29. 
24Ise, op. cit., pp. 116-18. 
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unions. Neither was this stride toward collectivism the work of single taxers, 
socialists, or other doctrinaire radicals. True, German intellectuals who were 
familiar with state forestry in Europe had contributed to the movement but the 
pressure for the change came out of American experience.25 
The National Forest Reservation Act of 1891 did not require the establish­
ment of reserves but gave authority to the President to withdraw from the 
public domain such timbered land as he deemed advisable for permanent gov­
ernment ownership and use. Presidents Harrison, Cleveland, and McKinley with­
drew some 50,000,000 acres but their action touched off opposition in Congress 
to further withdrawals and little more was accomplished until Theodore Roose 
velt became president. Despite his aristocratic background, Harvard education 
and political associations with influential conservatives, Roosevelt, under the 
tutelage and influence of Gifford Pinchot, espoused and pushed vigorously a 
program of public land reservation and utilization that makes his administra 
tion stand out with that of Franklin D. Roosevelt s as the greatest and most 
forward looking in matters of planning and conservation. Approximate y 
100,000,000 acres of public lands were placed under national forest status in 
Theodore Roosevelt's administration. 
Equally important was the establishment of a vigorous National Forest 
Service that assured adequate protection to the reserves from plundering, traine 
forces to fight fires and resist the encroachments of insects and disease, con 
trolled cutting, enforced restrictions on grazing in the national forests an 
conducted scientific experimentation in forest management and reforestation 
As a result of wise leadership, successful public relations work and generous 
appropriations despite frequent expressions of Congressional disapprova , t e 
National Forest Service quickly became an agency with an ardent o owing 
among professional foresters, farmers, and all those persons intereste in 
preservation of wild life and long range plans for the development an ar£ 
scale expansion of public forestry. No other agency in the growing e era 
bureaucracy was so advanced in its planning, as collectivist in its thoug t, as 
free from doctrinaire conservatism and at the same time free from utopia 
radicalism as was the National Forest Service under Pinchot, Graves, an 
successors.26 
The next major step in forest conservation and the extension of public 
control was taken in the Taft administration. New Englanders, alarmed by the 
flood menace and fearful that their mountain areas would be strippe o t 
splendid timber cover and defaced and forever marred by the advancing um 
25 Bernhard E. Fernow, Brief History of Forestry in Europe, The United States and 
Countries (Toronto, 1907), pp. 406 ff. 
26 Gifford Pinchot, Breaking New Ground (New York, 1947), is_ ^°^te"^r"j's°a^ement 
ated, and at times severely prejudiced but it is a remarkably c ea . , changinff 
and is indispensable for anyone working on the history of con 
land policies. 
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bermen pleaded successfully that Congress authorize the purchase and establish­
ment of national forests on the headwaters of the Connecticut and other impor­
tant rivers of the east. The Weeks Forest Purchase Act has made possible the 
great forests now being developed by the Federal government along the Appa-
achian ridge from Maine to Georgia, in the Northern Lake states, and in the 
older states of the lower Mississippi. Individualism and laissez fake were thus 
given o y ows in the citadel of capitalism. The American capacity to adapt 
its social philosophy to practical necessity has never been better illustrated.^^ 
Long after 1891 the public land states continued hostile to forest conser­
vation maintaining that other sections had exploited their resources as they 
wished and that the timber of the west should not be locked up for future 
Sshed TS "I?- T Stat6S °PP°Sed Wlthdrawals and i" line with past policy 
wi h d the public lands transferred to private hands without reservations. With 
vovI nLni !• T Cntry; Permanent Mention of the land by the Federal 
g , res notions on land use, leasing and stumpage fees the forest 
encroachmenfram ^tlT^ C°ndemned aS the exercise of unconstitutional power, 
public funds UP°n "g °f the StatCS and °f lndividuals and filching of 
contemnllf f^ t0 maintain that attitude» however, as it 
reflected that ' VT'" that constituted 50 much of the region and 
nfl^cefl d / mr °f the W£St in P°P«*tion and political 
penm^lltns 0f d 7 I ^ S0™nt had 
exforine and u *7** ** ^ and sovereignty from Mexico, in 
wlfr ilfoads CoTdnf 7* had ^ fkh * Pr°^ * 
ing to them die d ^ / mdUCed * fedaim these arid wastes by aPP^ 
enVthf wesf ™ and ^lties from Serais? 
a^ilg bmzenlvThl f ***** CVen breath-taking measure, 
w^in^he^ same states Th the funds derived from sales 
semi-arid Ameria wliirf T] ** UttIe ^°°d in a va* to reclaim 
impoverished soils hivhl *7} 8 mt° COmPetition with its outworn and 
drawiif f knfs fmm productive but equally highly subsidized land. With-
for reservoirs and water 'if J*"" h°meStead' the riSht to condemn land 
and the appropriation of^0a o{fams and Irrigation ditches 
condemned bv easten rnnm • lands for such schemes were all 
had been condemned by fhe'^st ^ ̂  ̂  ^ the Weeb Ad 
port fo?governmenffedlmTdof afdfityTn'tS^'t^^0" ̂  ̂  SUP' 
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individualism of the past could no longer serve in the twentieth century world. 
The government in business did not frighten people who foresaw that its result 
would be growth and economic progress for many areas. 
The Reclamation Act of 1902 provided that 95% of the income from the 
public lands in the thirteen states and three territories containing semi-arid 
lands was to go into a revolving fund for the construction of dams and reser­
voirs to impound water for the irrigation of the parched land. Income from 
water rents was also to feed the fund. Since the remaining five per cent of 
public land receipts was already allotted for education the act of 1902 marked 
the final abandonment of the notion that the lands should provide any revenue 
for or even reimburse the Federal government for its large expense in manag­
ing them. 
Large scale government subsidies to agriculture thus began in a Republican 
Roosevelt administration. Some would say that no greater handout to special 
interests has been given.28 Since 1902 and through 1949 more than $1,805,-
000,000 have been appropriated for reclamation projects. The size of the 
appropriation for 1949—$266,000,000—and the numerous projects that are 
being pressed upon Congress calling for vastly greater sums indicate that we 
are closer to the beginning than the end. Not only are giant dams and storage 
basins, hundreds of miles of canals, vast pumping projects, and huge power 
developments being undertaken but the course of major rivers is being reversed, 
all for the major purpose of providing water for irrigation. 
Many of the reclamation projects have not been economically successful 
and few could have been financed in any sound way without grafting on them 
hydroelectric power development.29 The sale of electric power has provided 
much of the income and the cost of the various projects. Increasingly, as less and 
less economically feasible irrigation projects were proposed, power was included 
to finance and justify them. Long before the inauguration of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and even prior to the building of Muscle Shoals Dam on the Ten­
nessee which marked the beginning of the Tennessee Valley development, the 
Federal power industry, a thoroughly socialistic scheme, was under way, not at 
the urging of the few theoretical socialists but through the strong administrative 
leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, supported by numerous 
28 Triple A farm relief of 1933 was an emergency measure designed to bring the farmers 
out of the worst depression we have suffered, though the subsidy program therein 
established has grown into a different monster whose longevity is appalling. The data 
on appropriations for the Reclamation Service is computed from the Annual Report of 
the Commissioner Bureau of Reclamation to the Secretary of the Interior, 1949, P- 70. 
Needless to say the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Interior and of the Recla­
mation Service, now the Bureau of Reclamation, are most detailed and useful but are 
slanted, apologetic, uncritical and tinged with propagandists fervor. 
' ̂i? k6S' cr'?'ca' analysis of government reclamation activity, now somewhat dated but 
still useful is R. P. Teele, The Economics of hand Reclamation in the United States 
1 Chicago, 1927). 
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western Republicans and Democrats. Furthermore, Roosevelt, who has recently 
been characterized as a conservative progressive, and Pinchot were responsible 
for the withdrawal of water power sites to assure public control, ownership, 
utilization and a fair rate structure when development was undertaken. Today, 
the United States government is the greatest power producing agent in the 
world. Such tremendous structures with their enormous power output as 
Boulder, Shasta, Grand Coulee, Shoshone, Friant, Arrowrock, and Roosevelt, to 
name only a few are the result of the demand of the west for Federal aid in 
developing the arid lands. 
American individualism, the belief that private interests could best and 
most usefully exploit the mineral resources of the public domain had been 
responsible for the transfer of the Calumet and Hecla copper of Michigan, the 
Anaconda World s Richest Mill ' lode in Montana, the Mesabi iron field in 
Minnesota and other valuable deposits to private ownership.33 Private enter­
prises rapidly developed these and other natural resources and excited national 
pride in the growing industrial strength of the United States. Before long, 
however, the fear was aroused that "monopoly" was being established in the 
mining industry as in manufacturing, transportation, banking, and in land 
ownership and that too much economic power and too much wealth was in too 
few hands. Again, however, it was from the conservationist that the impetus 
came for government reservation of mineral land and the practice of leasing. 
Exhaustion of natural resources was a widely discussed topic around the 
turn of the century when predictions were being made that our coal, our oil, 
other minerals, and forests would soon be depleted as to force dependence on 
high cost mines, expensive timber and importation from abroad.-" Fearing that 
the still unplumbed resources on the remaining public lands would soon be 
acquired by private interests who would be concerned to transform them into 
wealth at the earliest possible moment, Roosevelt, under the continued guidance 
of Pxnchot, withdrew from entry and private acquisition the sub-soil rights on 
all remaining public lands suspected of having value for their minerals. These 
withdrawals gave Congress time over the years to formulate legislation for 
leasing these lands to mining and oil companies under such conditions as were 
deemed essential to assure supplies to meet current needs and those of the future 
and especially to meet the needs of the Navy. Royalties from the mineral develop­
ment were assigned to the reclamation fund.32 Not again could a United States 
Steel Corporation, a Utah Copper Company or a Standard Oil Company secure 
s2VSWL>&=: ~ 
opposition to monopolistic control of valuable resources! exhaustion more than 
32 John Ise, The United. States Oil Policy (New Haven T Q ->C \ • • reserves. y U Haven, 1926), is important on mineral 
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ownership of rich deposits which they might exploit and solely profit from 
without regard to other social interests, future needs or public welfare. 
Conservation, the term popularly used for the changes being introduced 
into land policy, meant in practice the careful use and management of the 
natural resources of the public domain. By purely pragmatic reasoning the 
leaders of the movement had reached the conclusion that the government should 
not only retain or "reserve" title to ungranted lands but should manage and 
control their use and exploitation to assure their wise and cautious use with 
the profits derived therefrom assigned to other worthy objects for expansion. 
This did not necessarily mean putting the government in business. Where these 
objectives could be attained under private development government controls 
would only be used to assure that end. Lumbering has been done within the 
National Forests only by private enterprise; public power has been sold to 
private distributing and manufacturing companies; drilling for oil and mining 
phosphate, coal and other minerals on public lands has been done by private 
interests. But no longer may the timber within the National Forests be waste-
fully cut or drilling for oil be continued in an overstocked market; no longer 
may a small part of the coal be extracted once a mine is opened or the power 
generated at a government plant be sold at excessively high prices to consumers. 
After the great withdrawals for National Forests there remained large 
areas of public domain good for forage. These grass or range lands varied 
widely in vegetation, capacity to support cattle and sheep, and in economic 
value to interested groups. Being unfenced and completely unregulated they 
were pastured early and with harmful effect in the spring by livestock men 
anxious to save their own forage. The edible grasses were browsed too closely, 
were pastured too long, and were trampled badly by too many sheep and 
cattle. As a result, the more nutritious plants were killed out in a greater or 
less degree and noxious weeds came in; removal of the binding effect of the 
plant cover permitted erosion to strip off the soil and cover with silt agricul­
tural lands in the valleys or fill up the reservoirs and ditches. Unregulated and 
uncontrolled use of the public range lands also produced strife between live­
stock interests. 
In contrast, range land within the National Forests was fenced, the num­
ber of animals permitted on it was carefully correlated with the carrying ca-
pacity, overgrazing was not permitted, noxious weeds were eliminated, erosion 
was minimized, seeding and replanting was done and experiments were con-
ucted in the introduction of new and hardy types of grasses. In this way the 
National Forest ranges continued to provide well for their users, strife was 
avoided, and the management and development costs were paid by users on a 
permittee basis. 
The extension of range control within the National Forests was not accom-
p ished without friction and sharp opposition from livestock interests. How-
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ever, with a decentralized control and local participation in the framing of 
policies and regulations this opposition gradually dissolved. It was another 
matter, however, to secure agreement among the livestock people concerning 
the best way of bringing order and improved conditions to the public domain 
range. 
A third of a century was spent in discussion, and argument as to the need 
or and best way of obtaining controlled use of grazing on the remaining public 
lands. Proposals were advanced to turn the land over to the states for their 
a ministration, to permit private groups of livestock men to organize grazing 
districts on the public lands and to maintain controls over their use, to add the 
pu ic lands to existing National Forests for administrative and regulatory 
purposes, to sell or transfer the lands in large grazing homesteads to livestock 
interests and to establish a new government bureau whose task it should be 
to introduce controlled use of the range. 
Bureaucratic bickerings as well as the opposition of western livestock inter­
ests delayed the final solution. The United States Department of Agriculture 
c°n en e t at the grazing of livestock was an agricultural matter and problems 
• ^ J° ^ an ^and use should be administered by an agency thoroughly 
integrated with its Bureau of Animal Industry, Soil Conservation Service, Na-
icnal Forest Service and Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Like every good 
ureaucratic agent, the Department of the Interior disliked giving up any field 
authority and fought vigorously to retain the public lands and, when it saw 
witlV it, n^Sentiment 'n hehalf of conservatism, to have a new agency created 
within the Department to handle the controlled use of the range 
condition ^ t wken arr>idst depression, drought, poor range 
sTates eaidl  ̂ d̂ualists of the grazing 
fin 1witht r cPPL°Sltl0n and j°ined With °thers wh0 h*d ^red the 
mentl I" i "T*** kndS fr°m P"Vate fhe establish-
Zer theZTTI °°Tu ? ̂  ̂  A nCW "*»<* was ^ated to admin-
Lfnd Office fnt tH R ? *** *** COnsoIidated w*h the old General 
draw Td I lace ^ °f It was authorized to with-
acres or all the nTl^l °R|AN'ZED CONTRO1 80,000,000 acres, later 142,000,000 
to have anv vl\ f ( ^reserved and ungranted that had or seemed 
fer of and tot 'r PUrP°SeS> this ended the trans" 
stead and the recT TT !?' ^ ^ Sma" five acre resid^ce home-
T ue he tVou ZTl '  ̂into individuaI hands' 
struggles totZ o.eTnr ng agend6S ^ StiH racked jealous c  taKe over or swallow UD each OTHER FU„ • , r , , ... 
ture and Interior remains unresolved desoS th a gn " 
^ „i(h the :rsxr̂ :̂x £ 
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perhaps of securing additional handouts from the Treasury. Numerous political 
problems affecting the public lands remain unsolved.83 
We have thus seen how beginning with 1891 and continuing until today 
the old policy of permitting, in fact encouraging the rapid transfer of the 
public lands with their resources into private ownership was breached and 
finally abandoned. No longer did private ownership seem the highest goal. 
Instead, there was substituted for it public ownership, public controls designed 
to ensure intelligent use of the resources, distribute their benefits more widely 
and safeguard the interests of future generations. In the administration of its 
public lands America has moved far from the revenue concept, through the 
free grant and monopoly stage, which only partly met the objectives of the 
reformers, through the third period in which permanent and public ownership 
and controls were established. We are now beginning to reap the benefits. We 
all may enjoy the beauties and scenic wonders of the National parks and forests, 
thrill at the gigantic dams at Boulder and Grand Coulee, marvel at the way 
reclamation and water projects have made great desert areas produce rich crops 
and thriving cities. The liberal and reform position of the nineteenth century 
might have avoided some of the worst blunders of the past but because restric­
tion was unacceptable to all but a few it had to be replaced by a philosophy of 
use that was more socially minded. 
orelnu'^°0(' .on t'le 1uesd°n of bringing the remaining public range lands under 
Re ten c C°nr?J's Louise Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain. Disposal and 
Hoover r Pol'".es' 1900-1930 (Stanford, 1951). For the recommendatipns of the 
Executi p®miss'on see The Hoover Commission Report on Reorganization of the 
e branch of the Government (New York, 1949), 253-57. 



















